BOSNIAN IDENTITY BETWEEN NATIONALISM, (IN)TOLERANCE AND (A)THEISM by Jeftic, Alma
FACTA UNIVERSITATIS  
Series: Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History Vol. 16, No 1, 2017, pp. 37 - 49 
DOI: 10.22190/FUPSPH1701037J 
BOSNIAN IDENTITY BETWEEN NATIONALISM, 
(IN)TOLERANCE AND (A)THEISM 
 UDC 316.74:2(497.6) + 323.1(497.6) 
Alma Jeftić 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, International University of Sarajevo,  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Abstract. This article discusses the historical changes in religious practices in Bosnia-
Herzegovina from the communist era to the post-war period in line with their influence 
on identity and intergroup (inter-ethnic, inter-religious) relations. There is a lack of 
evidence on whether people did not overtly express their religious beliefs during 
communism even though they were covertly religious, or whether they started engaging 
in the religious practice during and after the 1992-1995 war in order to establish group 
connectedness, cohesion, and fulfill certain needs. “Bosnian identity” will be described 
as a puzzle formed by the “remains” of the previous regime and the “new additions” of 
the post-war period. The discourse of power dominates in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
enables prohibitions of different types of dialogue that can lead to better understanding 
of differences and Other(s). The main problem that will be addressed in this article is 
the (non)existing Bosnian identity analyzed through “jouissance” of nationalism, 
intolerance and religion. The contradictions of Sigmund Freud’s concept of identification, 
and the relation of that concept to the body and power in a post-war divided society 
will be discussed. We can conclude that the main discourse of power operates with 
religion in order to establish the “jigsaw puzzle of Bosnian identity”. The presence of 
those who either live in a different system (yugonostalgic people, Homo Yugoslavicus), 
or those who do not believe (atheists) simply adds a new dimension to the currently 
established system which can be used to further explain if the overtly expressed beliefs 
will remain unchanged in case of the establishment of a new system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article discusses the historical changes in religious practices in Bosnia-
Herzegovina from the communist era to the post-war period in line with their influence 
on identity and intergroup (inter-ethnic, inter-religious) relations. There is a lack of 
evidence on whether people did not overtly express their religious beliefs during 
communism even though they were covertly religious, or whether they started engaging 
in religious practice during and after the 1992-1995 war in order to establish group 
connectedness, cohesion, and fulfill certain needs. Regardless of which approach one 
supports, it is evident that the higher level of religiosity among Bosnians did not 
contribute to greater social cohesion, tolerance and suppression of nationalist rhetoric at 
the present time. In this paper the term “Bosnian identity” is understood as a combination 
of several “remains” from the past regime (Communist and post-Communist era), and 
“new-additions of the 1992-1995 war and post-war period. Following these claims, the 
analysis includes Homo Yugoslavicus as a representative of the past regime, New Man 
who lives in contemporary society and who has embraced its principles, and New-Old 
Man who lives in contemporary society but who did not embrace all the principles fully.  
The theoretical perspectives of Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan will be used to 
explain the onset of intolerance and nationalism in multicultural societies like Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Although these social and psychological theorists have not written 
extensively on this issue, their work contributes a lot to the contemporary analysis of 
post-war divided societies. Their ideas are important particularly for the insights they 
provide into the links between religion and power.  
The main problems that will be addressed in this article are: the ways through which 
Bosnians have (not) been engaging in religious practices from the communist regime 
until the present time, the position of Homo Yugoslavicus, New Man and New-Old Man 
in contemporary society, and the jigsaw puzzle of Bosnian identity that can be defined as 
a byproduct of surplus of religion, group divisions and intolerance created in order to 
correspond to the current socio-political milieu. 
The contradictions of Sigmund Freud‟s concept of identification, and the relation of 
that concept to the body and power in the post-war divided society will be discussed in 
order to determine whether the main discourse of power operates with the aim to 
establish three main constituent groups of people that will continue to (ab)use religion in 
order to fulfill their extrinsic needs and promote (in)tolerance.  
2. SLAVIC NARRATIVE ON RELIGION AND IDENTITY 
Julia Kristeva (1982) emphasized that psychoanalytic discourse on the Balkans 
constructs the region according to certain theoretical tenets and then attempts to 
disidentify with its own construction as if it were an “essential” Balkan identity. In order 
to define a symbolic space and civic subjectivity Kristeva (1982) abjects the Balkans as 
the filth of Europe and invokes her “theory of the abject”, psychoanalytic theories of 
character, civilization, and sexuality, as well as the logic of exclusion. On the grounds of 
the abovementioned arguments, Kristeva asks the rhetorical question: “When did God die 
in the Balkans?” 
According to Kristeva Christianity is deeply rooted in European cultural memory and 
it also represents a symbolic structure of complete subjectivity, therefore, historically, 
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Western and Orthodox Christianity represent different cultural memories and explain 
Europe's cultural aporia because they constitute different and incomplete subjectivities 
(Kristeva 2000). That contributes to the fragmentation of the identity and prevents Balkan 
countries from developing one unique civic narrative.  
Kristeva (1982, 2000) attributes to Orthodox Christianity a large share of the blame 
for the rise of “tribal” nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and she also 
constructs an analysis of the “Orthodox psyche”, which should be understood as a power 
discourse on the “Orthodox body”. However, her theory is built upon Freud's theory of 
the Oedipus complex; therefore, she described Western Christianity as rational and 
Orthodox Christianity as emotional. Kristeva (1982, 209) offers this psychoanalytic 
interpretation of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox interpretations of the Holy Trinity: “If 
one is attacked as filth, one must fight back as filth!”; therefore, she suggests the means 
for turning the tables on her representation of the Balkans as abject of Europe's superego: 
“For, facing abjection, meaning has only a scored, rejected, ab-jected meaning – a 
comical one” (Kristeva 1982, 209). In this sense, she associated abject and abjection to 
Freud's analysis of jokes and humor, especially his jokes on Jews. 
Sigmund Freud was a well-known for his willingness to use humor to illustrate a 
psychoanalytic concept and to express his own emotions about aspects of his struggles as 
a Jew and as the originator of psychoanalysis. His theory on sublimation and anal 
eroticism had played a part in the discursive development of the Balkan identity as he 
maintains that the Balkan people have a proclivity for anal eroticism that impedes 
sublimation and the civilizational process (Freud 1968, 10:214).  
Bjelić (2006) analyzed the etymology of the word “Slav” and discovered that it was 
derived from the word “slovenly” which means “lazy and dirty” according to the Oxford 
English Dictionary. It is an important etymological detail because it may strengthen 
Freud's allusion to the Balkans' homoerotic desires between two sleeping men and also 
Kristeva's about the latent homosexuality of Orthodox Slavs, since it seems that the 
Oxford English Dictionary has conspired in the creation of a linguistic hegemony, which 
has contributed to the self-essentialization of Balkan anal identity (Bjelić 2006). 
However, linguistic hegemony implies more than two explanations of the Balkan 
identity, especially when it refers to the Bosnian identity, since it includes all the 
important aspects of the puzzle: communist identity, post-communist identity, and post-
war identity (1992-1995 war).  
It is interesting how the puzzle has changed through time in a way that the communist 
secular picture was replaced by a religious picture of three influential religions that 
compete among each other in a number of pieces that they embrace in one puzzle. 
However, it is also important to mention that these changes have not occurred over night, 
and that the distance from “Homo Yugoslavicus” has led to the creation of three (or even 
more, if we count non-constituent people) groups of individuals. While Homo 
Yugoslavicus was living according to the rules that, in Žižek‟s sense, used to combine 
pleasure with certain constraint, New Man has exposed his/her body in the real 
Foucault‟s sense: a place where even the most subtle social skills form a network of 
relationships that enable a wide scale of power to be organized.  
That switch from the democracy of “chocolate laxative” to the “free New Man” has 
brought completely new constraints in terms of everyday activities, work, social 
gatherings and the expression of religion. As much as Homo Yugoslavicus was 
constrained in terms of his/her freedom to express and practice religion, free New Man 
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and New-Old Man are forced to freely and openly expresses his/her religious and 
spiritual self. One of the major threats in contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina can be 
symbolically presented in the shape of the old Homo Yugoslavicus (and New-Old Man if 
he/she is still embracing the remains of the old regime) who represents the return of the 
politics of previous times. However, the idea that all those who share the ideal of the ex-
Yugoslav “brotherhood and unity” can outnumber the New Men emerges as another 
disappearance of God in the Balkans (or, more precisely, Bosnia-Herzegovina). The 
question here is not the simple appearance or disappearance of religion in Bosnia, or the 
way through which members of the puzzle engage in religious practice, but the reasons 
for the uses and abuses of religion for the sake of tolerance and freedom. Having in mind 
the complicated historical background of Bosnia, a brief analysis of representation of 
religion in this region will be provided. 
3. OVERT AND COVERT RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA THROUGH HISTORY 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a country represents the meeting place of different peoples, 
customs and religions. It is inhabited by three major ethnic and religious groups: the 
Roman Catholic Croats, the Muslim Bosniaks, and the Eastern Orthodox Serbs. However, 
during its history Bosnia experienced several changes related to the visibility of religious 
practices, customs and symbols due to the different political regimes. It is interesting to 
notice that during communism religion was neither publicly expressed nor practiced, 
while the country underwent a period of increased religiosity after the fall of communism 
in the 1990s, which was also accompanied by the 1992-1995 war. During the war the 
engaged parties defined themselves mostly in terms of their religious identities.  
However, there have been no strong indicators that could explain it if people have 
become more openly religious since the signing of the Dayton agreement, or this increase 
in religiosity is mostly a result of the conflict or the fall of Communism (Hacić Vlahović 
2008). It is difficult to conclude with certainty how and why the religious revival 
occurred at the beginning of the 1990s in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to which extent the 
complicated jigsaw puzzle has started to shape both the political and everyday life of 
ordinary Bosnian. It is also unclear whether people have become more openly religious 
due to nationalist sentiments, opportunism, the economic standard or intrinsic belief. The 
data collected during the communist period leave some degree of reasonable doubt as to 
whether society had actually truly secularized in the first place, or if people had simply 
pretended to become less religious in order to protect themselves (Hacić Vlahović 2008). 
In order to understand both religious practices and the ways through which religion 
has been spreading in Bosnia-Herzegovina (and the Balkans in general), one has to take 
into consideration the beliefs, self-identification, emotional responses to religion as well 
as intergroup processes between different religious groups through history. Also, it 
should not be forgotten that the growth of religiosity during and after the 1992-1995 war 
may be a case of the increase in the public visibility of religiosity which does not 
necessarily need to be related to the changes in beliefs and practices.  
Since religious identity and ethnic identity in Yugoslavia were closely interwoven, 
religion was seen as an obstacle in the effort to unite the country and was therefore 
limited (Bringa 2002). According to Bringa (2002) this was done in order to preserve 
social cohesion and prevent nationalism. Therefore, religion was becoming a marginal 
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aspect of the citizen‟s belief and a phenomenon which appeared to survive mainly in rural 
areas and among the less educationally advanced and older segments of the population 
(Cohen 1998, 47). The real progress in secularization happened in the 1960s due to a 
demographic change, and the number of believers decreased by thirty percent between 
1964 and 1968, while the number of those claiming to be atheist or non-religious 
increased by more than twenty percent (Hacić Vlahović 2008).  
A study conducted by the Institute for the Study of National Relations in 1988 
showed that respondents not only continued to rely on religion, but that religion was once 
again emerging as an important factor in political life (Velikonja 2003). The census data 
from the 1970s and 1980s show that religious practice among Yugoslav youth was steadily 
increasing, from a low rate of 11% in 1974 to 34% in 1989 (Hacić Vlahović 2008). It is also 
important to mention that a large percentage of the population identified with their 
national religion, even when they did not practice that particular religion. When asked 
directly in 1988, between 57% and 60% of people in all three ethnic groups believed that 
religion could be used as a surrogate for national identity (Velikonja 2003).  
Even though religion was marginalized during the communist era, it was still present in 
society and among its members; also, it started to play a role in ethnic and national 
identification in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the 1990s communism was failing throughout 
Europe, while in Bosnia democracy brought religious freedom and the visible expression of 
religious symbols and practices (Bringa 2002). However, religion started being exploited by 
nationalist leaders who were using it as a means to form cohesive groups. From a profoundly 
secularized society, in which religion and religious institutions had been even more 
marginalized than in other parts of Eastern Europe, over the course of only two decades the 
countries in the Western Balkans have become societies with high rates of religious 
identification, while religious communities have acquired a prominent place in public life 
(Đorđević 2007, 79-93, according to Van Den Berg et al. 2014). 
It is difficult to say how much religious beliefs in Bosnia have to do with devoutness 
and intrinsic values, on the one hand, and personal interests and extrinsic values, on the 
other. Forty years of communist rule dramatically reduced all religious elements and 
overwhelmed the jigsaw puzzle formed of small parts of complex identities. However, 
after the dissolution of Yugoslavia the people's desire to express their belonging to an 
ethnic or national community resulted in the public expression of religious beliefs. These, 
of course, threaten the secular character of the state and displace some inhabitants outside 
of the state borders and erase them from the puzzle. Atheists exist only as a threat for the 
newly established community, and, in order to survive, they have to express an indefinite 
level of tolerance towards their religious friends, very often ex comrades. The most 
interesting point about the jigsaw puzzle of Bosnian identity is the fact that small pieces 
consist of both religious and secular pictures which can be replaced in different ways and 
orders, making the puzzle very changeable based on the political situation, level of 
tolerance, personal desire and estimation of the current situation.  
However, the position of atheists in contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot easily 
be described in terms of a “group without a religion”. Some of these people were born in 
religious families but decided not to have any ties with religion; some of them were born 
and raised in atheist families; and some of them decided to become atheists in the later 
stages of their lives. Not being visibly engaged in religious practices means not to exist in 
terms of participation in other social and political spheres. While Homo Yugoslavicus 
was a part of the political structures mainly because he/she was not practicing religion (at 
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least not visibly), today‟s man has to adapt his/her body to the visible religious rituals in 
order to be perceived as a part of the social group. More or less similar explanations are 
coming from the former Soviet Union.  
Dramatic religious growth has occurred throughout the former Soviet Union in the 
past 30 years with approximately 100 million people joining religious groups for the first 
time (Froese 2004a). These religious revivals correspond to lessening restrictions on 
religious activity, and a comparative analysis of post-communist countries reveals that 
levels of religious pluralism are not commensurate to the levels of religious growth 
(Froese 2004a). Froese (2004b) provides the following explanations for the revival of 
religion in Russia: the diminishing of restriction on religious activity after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, and the prior conversion of the Russian people to scientific atheism which 
proved to be quite unsuccessful. 
 If one attempts to compare former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia in terms of 
religious revival after the dissolution of the countries he/she will most probably be caught 
in the religious-economies explanation of post-communist religious growth. When Robert 
Orsi talks about the study of lived religion he claims that it is shaped by and shapes the 
way family life is organized in terms of how the dead are buried, children disciplined, the 
past and present imagined, moral boundaries established and challenged, homes 
constructed, maintained and destroyed, the gods and spirits worshiped and importuned 
and so on (Orsi 2002, xxxii). Lived religion can also be viewed as a tool that provides 
new insight into the body, power, private and public space, and nationalism. Having in 
mind all of the above, one can conclude that the reasons for religious revival and the 
engagement into religious practice in Bosnia do not rely on intrinsic motivation and 
spiritual growth. However, there is no clear or empirically based link between new 
practitioners of religion and their extrinsic motivators besides the fact that only those who 
belong to one of the three main religious groups can enjoy benefits in terms of 
advancement in their career, scholarships, political positions and functions in government 
(including candidacy for the member of the Presidency). Those whose identity does not 
resemble one of the “big three” belong to the group of “Others” and thus lose the 
opportunity to get a position in the government or to become member of the Presidency.  
These “Others” include atheists, Jews, the Roman population, people from the “mixed 
religious” marriages who refuse to declare their religion and/or are mainly atheists. Some of 
them still share the spirit of Homo Yugoslavicus and believe that the idea of brotherhood 
and unity was the best solution for the people in the ex-Yugoslav region. Therefore, there is 
a battle between the surplus of religion on one side and the loss (or at least, lack) of 
religion on the other side. Regardless of being “visibly” religious in more or less the same 
way, the majority is still divided into three smaller groups of Muslims, Catholics and 
Orthodox. The battle of “who is the majority” and “who will outnumber” has been existing 
since the establishment of those groups and has been mainly related to the religious-
supply chain of extrinsic motivators. 
According to the World Values Survey data, in 1998 69,8% of Bosnians said that they 
were religious but by 2001, this figure had increased to 74,3%, which seems to indicate a 
significant increase in religiosity when compared to the latest pre-war data collected in 
1990, when only 43% of the population of the former Yugoslavia self-identified as 
religious (Hacić Vlahović 2008). According to Hacić Vlahović (2008, 80), the apparent 
growth in religiosity that happened in the 1990s is probably the result of the complex 
interaction of different factors such as: the recent war in which different national groups 
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were involved, unresolved problems with resettling war refugees, the active political role 
that religious leaders played during and after the war, a difficult post-communism 
transition from a centrally controlled to a market economy and the resulting erosion of 
social benefits, and, the introduction of religious education in schools. Also, major ethnic 
cleansing and resettlement led to significant socio-demographic changes resulting in the 
migration of the rural population from villages to the city centers.  
In the interviews Ana Hacić-Vlahović conducted with religious leaders and scholars in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina during 2008, many of them were uncertain whether true religiosity has 
come to the forefront but they argued that many people stated that they were religious, 
regardless of whether they were actually believers because it was advantageous to be 
religious. One of the things they all agreed on was that religion has become more visible 
today than it was before, but without providing a special explanation of why that happened. 
Also, some religious leaders warned that in this context, religion was used to create barriers 
between people. Today, more than twenty years after ending the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina the actual question is how religious attitudes are influencing the readiness for 
reconciliation between three big religious groups.  
In his study on religious attitudes and readiness for reconciliation, Puhalo (2015) 
discovered that the least readiness for cooperation can be found among confident believers, 
while forgiveness is highest among uncertain, agnostics and atheists. Also, Petrović (2010) 
found that the “older” generation (people who lived in former Yugoslavia) were more ready 
for reconciliation than “younger” generations who were born during the 1992-1995 war or 
later. It is still unclear whether the revival of religion after the fall of communism led to the 
strengthening of national identities which further led to the revival of animosities and even 
hatred among three religious groups (and the fourth one – “Other”, to which atheists 
belong). However, it is evident that the way the majority has been expressing their religious 
attitudes and the ways through which the majority has been practicing religion and 
expressing religious symbols have led to the revival of nationalism and intolerance.  
 
4. LIVED RELIGION AND DEAD TOLERANCE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA  
Religion serves as a constituent element of nationalism and in the Western Balkans, 
for example, religious communities were the main catalyst of nationalism and division. 
According to Rogobete (2009), religion can be rehabilitated by the ethnic conflicts that 
can later on cause more violence and aggression. The current situation in the ex-Yugoslav 
countries proves that argument, while divided communities exist on the basis of their 
religious and ethnic identities which serve as shelter and approval for in-group wrongdoings.  
Durkheim (1912/2008) argued that God is a symbolization of the social; therefore, 
religious nationalism appears as the public return of religion. Derrida writes that religion “is 
prescribed, not chosen freely in an act of pure and abstractly autonomous will” (Derrida 
1998, 27). Derrida makes it immanent in the social bond itself, in the miraculous qualities 
of the relationship between every self and every other, in the logic of the response, the 
action elemental to all social relations that religion is not in religious institutions, but in the 
institution itself, in the unengendered, unnamable, unproducible conditions that precede and 
are immanent in social being. Described that way, religion is not centered, but spread 
through all the institutions of political and social life. And besides that, religion is often the 
only language people can use in order to enter the public sphere.  
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Religious nationalism is a strategy for bounding the collectivity, restoring the nation 
as a collective agency and it is not a response to poverty, because in religious 
nationalism, money figures as a symbol of collective power, invested into the nation state 
that symbolizes importance. That is how God became a universal currency, being in all 
things, but not identical to any of them, the transcendental signified (Friedland 2002). 
Tolerance can be analyzed through public institutions, religious and political institutions, 
but also through the relationship between people and their experiences. Both lived religion 
and lived intolerance converge through different aspects of the social, national, secular and 
sacral context. However, each one of them includes within itself its own opposite, therefore, 
it is completely impossible to analyze any of them without analyzing intolerance, atheism, 
and nationalism in essence.  
Religious nationalism posits an institutionally specific substance of the social, neither 
the procedures of self-certain reason nor the play of self-interest, but rather the communal 
solidarities of faith. Primary practices through which this faith is performed are prayer, 
religious ritual, pilgrimage, and family life as a site of faith-based solidarity and of divine 
creation (Friedland 2002). Therefore, family life is organized within the practices of 
maintaining both power and surveillance through the control of the body. While people live 
across the institutions, groups may be found outside, on the margins, especially when they 
struggle within one institution. Also, the first forms of nationalism can be found through 
different forms of institutional representations, which includes both politics and religion. 
Nationalism is a state-centered form of collective subject formation, a form of state 
representation, one grounding the identity and legitimacy of the state in a population of 
individuals who inhabit a territory bounded by that state (Friedland 2002). Nationalism is 
not merely an ideology because it also represents a set of discursive practices by which 
both territorial and cultural identity can be formed and expressed. Also, it can be seen as 
a means for the achievement of personal goals, material in its essence.  
Money, seen as a fungible bodily fluid, has historically operated as a currency of the 
public sphere, exchanged from man to man, enabling men to accumulate the reproductive 
powers of women and to organize the productive forces of other men (Friedland 2002). 
Therefore, it serves as an erotic fluid whose circuits have been predominantly homosocial, 
and whose autonomous economy of pleasure contributes to (in Lacaninan words) jouissance 
of enjoyment, or, surplus of enjoyment. That surplus represents dangerous instrumentality that 
controls human bodies and reconstructs their identities. In contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina 
the national collective body and the individual body exist in parallel spheres; therefore, the 
self can be imagined only as a unitary, special agent. That is how jouissance of dominance 
and power has led to intolerance, nationalism and abuses of religion. 
 
5. “THE CAIN AND ABEL SYNDROME” AND THE POLITICS OF (IN)TOLERANCE  
According to the early classics, intolerance is generally innocuous, and it exerts little 
effect on politics because intolerant individuals are politically apathetic, and therefore 
politically negligible (McClosky and Brill 1983), while political activists and policy making 
elites tend to be tolerant (Sullivan, et al., 1993). However, these elites are usually under the 
protection of strong institutions. Contrary to that, more recent studies argue that intolerance 
is generally pernicious.  
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Yet, research confirms both hypotheses. However, even Ignatieff (1999) pointed out 
that the intolerance between two brothers is even stronger than the intolerance between 
complete strangers. “The Cain and Abel Syndrome” can be used in order to explain the 
narcissism of small differences, or, in plain language, reasons why tolerance usually exists 
only in a virtual way in multiethnic and multireligious societies such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The irony whereby those who know most about each other, and differ least from each 
other, may yet be most intolerant of each other describes conflicts between Bosniaks, 
Croats and Serbs living in Bosnia-Herzegovina (or, to put it other way round, Muslims, 
Catholics and the Orthodox). The puzzle of their identities shaped by both ethnicity and 
religion makes the understanding of their political behavior more complex. Also, the real 
toleration of their virtual tolerance towards each other complicates the existing situation 
and leads to the broken society of unrealistic desires. 
Those who are closest, geographically, ethnically, religiously, and in other ways, are 
usually the most divided. However, people at the same time feel very close with strangers, 
and that, ironically, increases the levels of international solidarity (Mendus 1999). It is not 
clear whether the establishment of a “group identity” can contribute to the increase of 
tolerance, or whether multiple collective identities should exist in society. Hence, the more 
scientists and philosophers talk about tolerance, the more they analyze it as a molecule, the 
less it exists in the societies. The force to create something that will represent both religious 
and political tolerance leads societies to the virtual level of common existence.  
Robert Orsi (1985) claims that the study of lived religion directs attention to institutions 
and persons, text and rituals, practice and theology, things and ideas. Both (in)toleration and 
religion act together while creating one level of meaning and power. That power is something 
that Foucault was trying to explain through disciplined bodies, More through Utopian 
society. The complicated puzzle of Bosnian identity exists through the excess of pleasure, 
excess of the past regimes and the punishment in case of intolerance and nationalism. There 
is a link between religion, nationalism, sexuality and the body in a way that whenever our 
nation is invoked we are more likely to refer to patriotism, “love for country”, religious 
values, and punishment for the out-group. Therefore, we might assume that religious 
nationalism is organized around erotic discourse, gendered order in society, non-disciplined 
bodies and punishment.  
Foucault (1995) claims that what occurs in societies is the production of transgressions 
and crimes that occurs in a circle in which criminals, policemen and judges are included. In 
contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina, the production of tolerance and religious beliefs is in 
place, and it includes within itself both intolerance and atheism. However, those who do 
not conform to the group norms that nowadays correspond to the visible religious practice 
as the important part of the social puzzle can experience consequences on their social and 
economic status. In that case it is recommended to discipline the non-conformist visible 
behavior and replace it with the more conformist ideal that fits the jigsaw puzzle of the 
existing social curriculum that supports the visible production of tolerance, religion, and 
love towards one‟s neighbor. Also, if some parts of the puzzle are connected to the different 
political regimes they have to be dismissed (or at least modified), for the sake of democracy 
and coexistence.  
The engagement in religious practice is not simply governed by group norms. It is more 
in line with Žižek‟s analogy of a chocolate laxative – what creates the wound also heals the 
wound. In the same sense every culture is just a compromise, and engagement in a certain 
social activity is just a small part of that compromise. People who engage in religious 
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practices in contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina do that in response to a compromise, and in 
the majority of situations they receive something in return (an intrinsic reward because they 
truly believe or an extrinsic reward in the shape of social recognition and/or status). In both 
situations citizens are trained and disciplined to follow the compromise which therefore 
becomes the rule and regulation. A disciplined body and soul in that case become 
imprisoned between the old Homo Yugoslavicus, New-Old Man, and New Man who is 
trying to follow the rules and therefore establish himself in the new society. However, this 
instrumentalization of knowledge, religion and a complicated past creates the battlefield 
where those who follow (or at least try to follow) the old rules (Homo Yugoslavicus) and 
those who embraced (or pretend that they have embraced) the rules of the new society meet 
and try to interact while balancing between different principles. The dominant religious 
discourse (or three dominant constituent discourses) create and define different spheres of 
life in the country: scholarships, employment opportunities, salaries, advancement in career, 
a voting system, and, above all, a way in which those people enjoy or think of enjoyment.  
 The psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (2002) says that we never enjoy something in spite 
of the law, but because of it. His term jouissance does not describe just an instinctive 
pleasure or sexual satisfaction, but Freud's Thanatos, or the instinct of death. This is the 
pleasure principle which works neither as a restriction of pleasure nor as its special part. 
It includes the possibility to go beyond the pleasure principle resulting in jouissance, 
organized not in spite of law, but in connection with it. The law does not exist to prevent 
crime, but to produce it. Also More writes about punishment as an invitation to commit 
more crimes (More 2003). However, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the contemporary religious 
discourse instead of engaging intrinsically religious individuals more actually produces 
more intolerance due to the excess of both spirituality and imposed beliefs and practices.  
Religion is abused as a mean of control, and it continues to exist in a form of omnipresent 
authority that leads to the excess of nationalism. Regardless of being intrinsically or 
extrinsically religious, an atheist or someone who just overtly practices religion, group 
belongingness is a fact that defines one‟s position in the socio-economic milieu. As religious 
identities somehow overlap with ethnic identities, (Bosniak – Muslim, Croat – Catholic, Serb 
– Orthodox), both identifications equally inscribe the identity definition that serves as a certain 
ticket to certain rights and benefits, such as a job in the government, candidacy for the 
Presidency, “minority” vs. “majority” status, scholarships etc. Regardless of being an ex 
comrade who either started to express his/her beliefs publicly, or has never practiced 
religion but found it good for his current position in society, one has become a part of the 
larger apparatus that has been producing like-minded three groups of people who have been 
serving their country since the ratification of the Dayton agreement (or even earlier).  
However, Homo Yugoslavicus cannot currently solve the existing puzzle of three 
constituent people since his/her time has expired and, according to the newly created system, 
his/her place is in the “Other” group. It is difficult to conclude if these people represent former 
comrades who rejected being classified as “ex”, or whether those people only embraced 
atheism as their belief and continued living life outside of the religious production of extrinsic 
values, intolerance and, at the end, nationalism. Studies conducted by psychologists (Petrovic 
2010; Puhalo 2015) prove that both atheists and people who lived in the former Yugoslavia 
and experienced “brotherhood and unity” are more likely to cooperate with other ethnic and 
religious groups, as well as to forgive and reconcile. However, one cannot claim that being 
Yugonostalgic and/or being an atheist are preconditions for being open-minded and socially 
skilled. The point is that we cannot be sure if the fall of communism brought the fall of 
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covertly expressed and practiced religious beliefs, or simply, whether the fall of communism 
brought a new era and New Man who was guided by Darwin‟s claim that the one who is 
most responsive to change is the one who survives. However, the newly created system 
supports the jigsaw puzzle of tripartite identity, while providing only certain benefits to the 
so-called Other.  
The jigsaw puzzle has to be completed successfully, not only on a governmental level, 
but in all other life areas, including job positions, scholarships, promotions etc. Through 
overtly expressed religious practices and emphasized religious beliefs a venue for tripartite 
structure of identity has been created together with a tripartite narrative, discourse and 
memory as well. Family practices have become institutional practices which, on the 
contrary, exist in order to discipline groups and preserve social cohesion.  
6. CONCLUSION 
It is still unclear whether Bosnians have been more religious since the aftermath of 
1992-1995 war than they used to be before; or if they were simply prevented from 
expressing their religiosity during the communist regime. However, the short historical 
overview given in this paper provided certain evidence for the history of group cohesion 
and (in)tolerance.  
Homo Yugoslavicus continues to exist through the family practices and those who 
still embrace the idea of brotherhood and unity. However, the current discourse and the 
existence of several parts of the puzzle that forms the Bosnian identity contribute more to 
the production of intolerance and nationalist rhetoric rather than to group cohesion and 
reconciliation between different ethnic/religious groups. We could conclude that the overlap 
between ethnic and religious identity contributes to the formation of the jigsaw puzzle of 
complicated identity structure of contemporary Bosniak, Serb and/or Croat (Muslim, 
Orthodox and Catholic, respectively).  
However, between these three narratives one can also find hundreds (or even more) 
parallel discourses that exist in the same time and space. The major differences between 
them are not even visible, but they can be easily discovered through the analysis of 
disciplined bodies that exist within each system. Also, nationalism that leads to intolerance 
through the usage of several means (religion, politics, money, sex), can also be understood 
through the analysis of thanatopolitics created with the purpose of controlling newly 
established narratives and types of enjoyment. 
Toleration always involves power relations, where those “in power” decide how to 
tolerate the “intolerable”. The current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina reveals that both 
religion and tolerance are in the realm of those who possess power. People engage in 
religious practices in order to fulfill a certain need, either spiritual or material. However, 
the type of reward one is seeking is what differentiates between one who believes 
intrinsically and one who wants to achieve something material: promotion, status, or at 
least – recognition for behaving in a socially accepted way. Therefore, discourse of religion 
and tolerance is formed according to the identity puzzle (based on what type of small pieces 
of puzzle form the identity of those in power). The presence of those who either live in a 
different system (yugonostalgic people, Homo Yugoslavicus), or those who do not believe 
(atheists) simply adds a new dimension to the currently established system which can be 
used to further explain if the overtly expressed beliefs will remain unchanged in case of 
the establishment of a new system. 
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BOSANSKI IDENTITET IZMEƉU NACIONALIZMA, 
(NE)TOLERANCIJE I (A)TEIZMA 
U ovom radu analiziraju se istorijske promene u praktikovanju religije u Bosni i Hercegovini od 
komunizma do posleratnog perioda u skladu sa njihovim utecajem na identitet i međugrupne 
(međuentitetske, međureligijske) odnose. Ne postoji dovoljno dokaza o skrivenom praktikovanju 
religije tokom komunizma, kao ni o početku javnog uključivanja u religijsku praksu tokom i nakon 
rata 1992-1995 s ciljem uspostavljanja bolje unutragrupne povezanosti, kohzije i zadovoljenja 
određenih potreba. “Bosanski identitet” je zamišljen kao puzla formirana od “ostataka” prethodnog 
režima i “novih dodataka” iz posleratnog perioda. Diskurs moċi dominira u Bosni i Hercegovini i 
onemoguċava različite vidove dijaloga koji mogu dovesti do boljeg razumevanja različitosti i Drugog. 
Osnovni problem koji se razmatra u ovom radu je (ne)postojeċi bosanski identitet analiziran kroz 
“jouissance” nacionalizma, netolerancije i religije. Kontradikcija sa Frojdovim konceptom identifikacije 
i odnos tog koncepta prema telu i moċi u posleratnom podeljenom društvu ċe biti posebno 
razmotrena. Zaključak je da glavni diskurs moċi deluje zajedno sa religijom kako bi se oformirala 
“puzla bosanskog identiteta”. Prisustvo onih koji još uvek žive u drugačijem sistemu (jugonostalgičari, 
Homo Yugoslavicus) ili onih koji ne veruju (ateisti) dodaje novu dimenziju veċ formiranom sistemu 
koja se može koristiti kako bi se analiziralo da li bi trenutno javno izražena uverenja ostala 
nepromenjena u slučaju uspostavljanja novog sistema.  
Ključne reči: identitet, netolerancija, religija, komunizam, Homo Yugoslavicus, Bosna i Hercegovina 
